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Abstract 
Continuous globalization and consequent knowledge integration lead to drastically increasing risks of product piracy, which require 
further countermeasures, other than the reactive legal measures currently primarily employed. This paper addresses the risk 
quantification and assessment problem decision makers in industry, specifically engineering industry, are facing. The method 
introduced focuses on the identification of product portfolio and value chain risks and allows for the determination of the company 
specific risk situation. The deduction of combating strategy alternatives is combined with a novel quantitative cost-benefit analysis 
of protection mechanisms, which enables well-founded anti-counterfeit decision making.  
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1. Introduction 
Being one of the oldest phenomena of manhood 
product piracy nowadays remains as present as ever. 
Constant internationalization lowers the imitation 
barriers Michael E. Porter described to be so valuable for 
competitive advantages [13]. On the one hand, risks for 
counterfeiters to be detected remain practically 
negligible for them; on the other hand, risks evolving for 
individuals, companies in various industries, or a 
countries economy as a whole, are significant. Originally 
the focus of counterfeiting literature lay on consumer 
industries, in recent years, however, especially the 
engineering industry was in focus due to its specific 
product cost structures (such as sales of spare parts) 
allowing great gains for counterfeiters. Product 
imitations intercept the innovation financing cycle and 
significantly lower the re-investment into research and 
development (see Fig. 1). 
The rising threat of product piracy is generally 
advised to be most effectively combated through a mix- 
ture of legal, organizational and technical protection 
mechanisms, whilst only relying on the preferred legal  
 
Fig. 1: Impact of imitations on re-investment into R&D according to 
[12] 
measure type is seen as insufficient [1,2,5]. Interlinking 
individual mechanisms in order to set up a defined 
know-how protection strategy has been the focus of 
previous research [10,12], a clear decision and operation 
guideline was so far missed by affected companies. 
More than anything they face a piracy risk quantification 
problem, which is essential for determining the amount 
of resources they ought to invest into their know-how 
strategy.  
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This paper therefore aims to enable company 
decision makers to quantitatively assess the product 
piracy risks they face and approximate the risk situation 
as a whole using internally available product data. This 
company specific counterfeit risk determination 
consequently allows the derivation of concrete 
economically reasonable countermeasures, which are 
then included in a dynamic an extended know-how 
strategy including continuous improvement adaptations. 
The paper therefore focuses on the first three steps of a 
corporate know-how strategy in depth:  
1. Identify the risk situation,  
2. Identify appropriate countermeasures;  
3. Prioritize fields of action [1].  
It furthermore quantitatively complements the iterative 
protection cycle shown in Fig. 2.  
 
Fig. 2: Iterative cycle of process protection adapted from [14] 
2. Fundamentals 
Despite its long existence and constantly increasing 
relevance, the concept of product piracy is not clearly 
defined in literature and no one uniform terminology 
exists covering all characteristics of know-how theft. 
Therefore also for this paper Minagawa et al’s broad 
definition of counterfeit being all “non-consensual 
acquisition of technology” is adapted [11, p.455]. Know-
how in this context is understood as technology 
knowledge and refers to the knowledge subcategory, 
which includes specific competitive advantages [8]. 
Using this as a basis, imitations are further differentiated 
according to their functional quality and degree of 
deception in comparison to the original [16]. 
Furthermore, the time horizon is seen as a useful 
indicator in order to differentiate between imitations and 
originals, with imitations always appearing last [12]. 
Central to counterfeiting research are the concepts of 
counterfeiting risks, causes and countermeasures, which 
are addressed below. 
  
2.1. Counterfeiting risks and causes  
Risk management focusing on measuring and 
controlling risks is vital to any corporate policy. Risks 
are generally divided into financial risks, such as 
liquidity or price risks on the one hand and operational 
risks, which are especially relevant with respect to 
counterfeit, on the other [6]. Essentially original 
equipment manufacturers face five counterfeit risk types: 
loss of competitive advantage due to knowledge lead, 
reputational loss, decline in sales, loss of market shares 
and unjustified recourse claims [17]. All these risk types 
are interdependent and can be aggregated in a final 
financial risk, specifically a negative effect on the profit 
of the original manufacturer. Practical experience, 
however, shows that the gravity of the individual risks so 
far relies on more or less accurate approximations and 
cannot be quantified precisely [6]. For this paper 
following the operational risk definition of the Basel 
Committee of Banking Supervision risks are seen to 
arise either due to internal human, process or system 
failure, or due to external events [3](see Fig. 3).  
 
Fig. 3: Risk categories according to the definition of operational risks 
[9] 
2.2. Countermeasures 
An understanding of reasons and causes for 
counterfeiting is vital in order to be able to choose 
appropriate protection mechanisms. Similar to the non-
uniform definition of counterfeiting, no uniform 
categorization of countermeasures is to be found in 
literature. Generally legal, technical labelling 
mechanisms, product design, process design and 
customer commitment measures are depicted [1]. 
Specifically legal measures are well known to company 
representatives, but are said to be inefficient and only 
reactive [8,17]. Furthermore, studies generally show that 
countermeasures lag behind the actual counterfeiting 
threat – just about half of the interviewed companies 
made use of legal agreements, whilst only 7.5% included 
their external partners into their safety policy using a 
technical measure [4]. One the one hand the awareness 
in companies is lacking, on the other hand the 
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responsible person does not have the means to decide on 
which countermeasures to employ [16]. 
2.3. Know-how protection strategies 
Even though some of literature focuses on the 
application of single countermeasures, even less includes 
these measures into a holistic know-how protection 
strategy, which takes the specific company situation into 
consideration [9].  
Overall, the requirements for know-how protection 
strategies can be summarized in seven points. It has to 
include: 1. A holistic strategy evaluation, 2. An 
allocation of technical and organizational 
countermeasures to the risk situation should be included, 
3. Design advice for improvement cycles with better 
control mechanisms for success evaluation, 4. 
Practicable advice for inexperienced users, 5. A 
quantified risk and damage evaluation for the 
prioritization of strategy options, 6. Design 
recommendations for the organizational strategy 
anchorage, 7. Complexity reduction through clear and 
easily understandable conclusions [9]. In recent years 
literature including these aspects evolved. The work of 
Schnapauf [15] for example takes the organizational 
context and the complexity of the value-chain into 
consideration. Kleine [8] extends upon this and employs 
a simulative approach, using scenarios to test various 
risk strategy alternatives. However, especially the fifth 
aspect of a quantified risk evaluation is still open to 
research and therefore addressed in this paper.  
3. Risk assessment model  
During counterfeiting strategy planning the economic 
examination of a variety of consequences is essential [8]. 
A found understanding of the risk situation is necessary 
in order to understand the organizational, economic and 
social relevance and justify an efficient and effective 
know-how protection strategy.  
In order to increase the operability of the risk 
quantification model, first the complexity was reduced 
by subdividing the company into the subsystems value-
added process and product. Each of these subsystems 
was then again divided into their characteristics and 
further subsystems and assigned influencing factors 
accordingly. Factors excluded from the current analysis 
for the time being were those describing the company 
conditions as a whole, mainly the company network 
complexity, the activity in risky markets, the vertical and 
horizontal integration, as well as the product portfolio.  
Focusing on the value-added process risks first, a 
three dimensional matrix allowing the deduction of risk 
events is devised based on the previously outlined 
operational risks and associated risk causes. Through 
interlinking risks with the risk environment and the 
causes for know-how leakage, the resulting risk events 
could be systematically captured with respect to their 
harm effects. In order to quantify the operational risks a 
methodical adaptation of the method employed by the 
‘Basel Committee for Banking Supervision’ was used 
[2]. The scorecard-approach defines key-risk-indicators 
and scales identified risks from 1(acceptable) to 
3(completely inacceptable) risk levels. The indicators 
hereby are chosen in accordance to the requirements: 
relevance, no redundancies, measurability, auditability 
and independence. Visualizing these process risks in a 
risk cockpit using traffic light symbols allows an early 
identification of future trends, clearly showing the 
aggregated score (see Fig. 4). 
 
Fig. 4: Risk cockpit visualizing process risks [9] 
Looking at the product risks second, it is assumed 
that counterfeiters choose the products with which they 
can achieve the greatest production cost advantages 
compared to the original manufacturer. Again a risk 
matrix is devised depicting product risks with respect to 
the vulnerability, i.e. the potential extent of loss, and the 
probability of occurrence. Risk indicators influencing 
the probability of occurrence are chosen to be the 
quantity of sales, the percentage of manufacturing costs 
and the logistics intensity. The extent of loss is 
calculated directly using the profit share of the 
respective product within the whole company profit. 
Each of these indicators is then assigned a risk class, 
which includes three class boundaries. Finally, the risks 
identified in both subsystems are aggregated into a 
quantified total risk position (I-III). 
 
Fig. 5: Product risk matrix [9] 
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4. Risk quantification model  
Having laid the foundation for a sound understanding 
of the companies counterfeiting risks depending on the 
specific value-chain and product characteristics, these 
risks are now evaluated and assessed. The aim is to 
enable an optimal allocation of resources to chosen risk 
control measures. In order to compensate the uncertainty 
of future external influences the companies risk attitude 
in general is taken into consideration first. This risk 
attitude is the dominant factor governing the extent and 
intensity of countermeasures employed for the identified 
risk situation. The newly defined risk preference 
coefficient ‘c’ is calculated using a weighted sum of the 
factors ‘network complexity’, ‘risk market activity’, 
’vertical and horizontal integration’, which are already 
employed by Schapauf [15], and the additional 
‘Herfindahl index’. The Herfindahl index thereby 
depicts a coefficient of concentration, with a rising index 
indicating a high affinity for risk aversion [7]. 
Consequently, the counterfeit damage identified before 
is monetarily quantified both for process and products 
separately.  
Looking at product risks the assumption that the 
sales volume reduction is the dominant factor reducing 
the sales chart and increasing the loss potential due to 
counterfeit is followed. The damage level is calculated 
using the rate of substitution, the probability of 
occurrence (as defined in the risk quantification model) 
and the amount of fakes on the market. This damage 
level is then again used to determine the product 
counterfeit damage using the marginal return as the 
underlying, since substituted products do not incur any 
variable costs. 
ሺሻ ൌ ሺሻ כ ሺሻ    (1) 
ሺ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 ൌ  כ  כ    (3) 
Ƚ୍ matching coefficient 
ȝ 
  
DL damage level [0;1] 
KRI critical risk indicator 
mc percentage of manufacturing costs 
MR marginal return 
p(t) price
 
ሺሻ sales 
SP profit share 
SR substitution rate 
PO probability of occurrence 
x(t) quantity 
Y risk preference coefficient 
 
Examining process risks, it becomes evident that 
measures to reduce these risks have a greater impact on 
the company as a whole. Therefore, instead of the risk 
preference coefficient, the substitution rate and 
probability of occurrence are focused. Concentrating on 
a practicable and pragmatic approach, first an initial 
value for the risk capital is decided upon. Then, the 
amount of capital invested over time is adjusted based 
on the risk score. Through industry interviews it became 
evident that no uniform risk capital determination exists, 
however the following formula for the risk capital value 
could be deduced from the survey results: 
 
୍ ൌ Ƚ୍ כ      (4) 
 
This initial value represents the advised minimal 
capital investment into counterfeit protection 
mechanisms and shows that even with a risk probability 
of zero, fixed costs for the maintenance of security exist 
(ie. patent agents, plant admittance security, etc.). In 
order to adjust this initial value based on the company 
specific risk score, a scaling method taking the risk 
preference into account and allowing for a dynamic 
modelling is employed. The intensity of 
countermeasures therefore is determined as:  
 
ሺሻ ൌ ሺሻ ή Ⱦ ή ୍ ൅ ୍ ൌ ଵିୣ
షౙכ౮
ଵିୣషౙ ή Ⱦ ή ୍ ൅ ୍  (5) 
ሺሻ ൌ ቀ୰୧ୱ୩ୱୡ୭୰ୣሺ୲ሻଶ െ
ଵ
ଶቁ    (6) 
 
All parameters except the superelevation factor, 
which determined the upper bound on the monetarily 
assessed process risks, have been defined before. This 
final factor can be decided upon by the individual firm, 
nevertheless the here advised way is to base it on the 
maximum identified counterfeit damage: 
 
Ⱦ ൌ ୈୟ୫ୟ୥ୣ౭౥౨౩౪షౙ౗౩౛ష౩౰౛౤౗౨౟౥ୖେ౅    (7) 
 
It becomes evident that the above calculation of 
financial counterfeit damage is conducted under 
uncertainty. Aiming to limit this uncertainty various 
scenario techniques were considered, with the Monte-
Carlo simulation emerging as the most appropriate for 
the problem at hand. Through a large amount of 
simulation runs one obtains a distribution for the 
determined target parameter.  
5. Extended know-how protection strategy 
Having assessed and monetarily quantified both the 
process and product risks, these are now incorporated 
into an extended know-how protection strategy including 
the deduction of standardized strategy alternatives. 
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5.1. Choice of strategy alternatives 
The critical factor dominating the choice of 
counterfeit strategy alternatives is the proposition that 
the countermeasure has to cost less than the experienced 
damage. In order to help company representatives 
determine these alternatives a potential damage map was 
designed plotting the damage per piece against the lot 
size, both on a log-scale (see Fig. 6). The damage per 
piece is directly determined by taking the total damage 
from the 95%-confidence range of the Monte-Carlo 
simulation and dividing it by the amount of products 
produced.  
 
Fig. 6: Damage mapping depicting the deduction of strategy 
alternatives adapted from [9] 
Using the 1.000€ damage isoquant exemplarily as 
starting basis here, four standardized counterfeit 
protection strategies are deduced, allowing the grouping 
of products to predefined countermeasure categories: 
A –  Centralize using countermeasures with high 
fixed costs and low variable costs 
B –  Focus through investing in comprehensive 
countermeasures 
C –  Decentralize using countermeasures with low 
fixed and variable costs 
D –  Accept (no further investments)  
5.2. Method implementation 
The method outlined above is implemented in three 
stages: the preparation phase, the actual assessment and 
quantification phase and the final evaluation phase as 
depicted in Fig. 7.  
 
Fig. 7: Practical method implementation guideline [9] 
Using a case study this method was evaluated, also 
examining its applicability, solution orientation, validity 
and quality of forecasting. Including about 30.000 
products and researching nearly 360 fakes through the 
use of a professional research service, the obtained 
results confirm the validity of the deduced standardized 
strategies. First, through workshops within the respective 
company a risk matrix for the specific product portfolio 
was deduced. Next, defining c=-2, the products were 
transferred into a damage map, allowing the deduction 
of a company specific damage isoquant and boundaries 
for the described standardized protection strategies. In 
the examined case 75% of the products were assigned 
the strategy D (Accept) . More importantly, the most 
risky 15 products could be determined, which combined 
lead to 20% of the total damage caused and thus should 
be prioritized within the company’s counterfeiting 
efforts.  
6. Conclusion 
Having subdivided the counterfeiting risk analysis 
focusing on process and product risks separately first, a 
high method practicability was achieved. The company 
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specific risk position is assessed using key-risk-
indicators for process risks and a risk matrix for product 
risks first. Evaluating the identified risks in the 
quantification model, allows the deduction of strategy 
alternatives including a predefined category of 
countermeasures. The method developed not only stands 
out by allowing a monetary quantification of 
counterfeiting risks, but also through its high level of 
adaptation and its practical implementation guideline 
allowing for an economically viable and reliable choice 
of countermeasures.  
Being designed for machine and plant engineering as 
a main application field, the method is kept universal, so 
that through validation in other fields, the transferability 
of all findings can be facilitated easily. This universality, 
however, means that the deduced standardized strategies 
are not supported with specific countermeasures, but 
only categories are deduced. Further research regarding 
technical and economic efficiency and effectiveness of 
individual countermeasures is required in order to 
complete the extended know-how protection strategy. 
The risk understanding achieved through this paper 
allows for an increased acceptability of know-how 
protection, complementary analysis of countermeasure 
benefits for specific strategy alternatives is expected to 
raise this acceptability further.  
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